Author: Yana Zmagar

  • “If they lock me up again—well, then I’ll do the time.” Andrei Pochobut on Freedom, death row, and the right to return.

    “If they lock me up again—well, then I’ll do the time.” Andrei Pochobut on Freedom, death row, and the right to return.

    Polish-Belarusian journalist and activist Andrey Poczobut was released on April 28, 2026, after more than five years in prison and a penal colony, and 1,860 days—as he counts them from the day of his arrest. For decades his name was associated with pressure on Poland’s minority in Belarus and on independent journalism there; now, at liberty, he talks in detail about solitary confinement, living next to a death-row wing, courtroom humiliation, and why he at first refused to leave Belarus in a night convoy—until he was promised he could legally return home.

    Who Poczobut is and why his case is “political by definition”

    Poczobut was born in Belarus, retained Belarusian citizenship, and lived for many years in Hrodna, where he was a prominent figure in the Union of Poles. At the same time he worked as a correspondent for Poland’s influential Gazeta Wyborcza—reporting on provincial Belarus, regional history, and minority issues that the authorities treated as a “political trail.” Before his latest arrest in 2021 he had already faced pressure from security forces after the 2010–2011 protests: fines, short detentions, and the threat of a suspended sentence over publications about the regime. Human rights defenders in the EU and Polish officials portray the present charges and eight-year sentence as payback for his words and his ties to the Polish community, rather than as an ordinary criminal case.

    A “five for five” exchange: diplomacy where resolutions helped little for years

    According to BelTA’s summary, release was the outcome of prolonged contacts between the Belarusian KGB and Polish intelligence; the process was described as especially difficult. The exchange took place at the border, formally as “five for five.” Polish officials also publicly linked the breakthrough to firm US engagement and cited the role of President Trump’s administration and the special representative on Belarus. The first footage of Poczobut abroad was published by the Polish-Belarusian “Svaboda” newsroom: a Gazeta Wyborcza correspondent asks him to speak to readers—he talks about people’s “resilience” and what they do.

    Timeline: from arrest in Hrodna to Navapolatsk colony

    March 2021 — a new arrest. January–February 2023 — trial and verdict: eight years in a strict-regime penal colony under articles of the Belarusian Criminal Code which, in independent media’s shorthand, amounted to harming “national security” and incitement to hatred (Articles 361 and 130).

    The sentence was served in Navapolatsk correctional facility PK-1, which journalists and the UN had written about for years: harsh regime, frequent disciplinary isolation, limited family access. Weeks before his long-form interview Novy Chas quoted the deputy head of the colony as saying something like “They needed him alive, not dead.” Poczobut is ironic: nonetheless they barely cared for his health; to fight exhaustion he relied on physical exercise in the inhuman conditions of his cell—and his weight eventually fell almost to a critical level for him.

    No plea for mercy and no “forever” departure

    Novy Chas notes earlier patterns—release tied to a plea for clemency or emigration. Poczobut repeatedly rejected those terms, insisting on counting as a political figure on Belarusian soil without a humiliating deal with the administration.

    Trial, verdict, and the “Battle for Pride” in the courtroom

    A trial of a journalist on political charges is almost always staged for the cameras. In an interview with Nasha Niva (retold for Gazeta Wyborcza) Poczobut reconstructs being told to stand with his back to the gallery “for video protocol”; he refuses—looking at people so as not to lose even small moral ground. Years later he calls that kind of refusal part of preserved dignity—not where the sentence is written down, but where they try to turn you into voiceless courtroom furniture.

    Death-row wing, punishment cells, and physical limits

    The calendar was not the only torture: the cell itself mattered. Poczobut described being held in a block next to death-row cells: you hear voices and know people on the other side of the wall are not serving an abstract “regime sentence” but are in the last stretch of verdicts before execution—the psychological strain for anyone sane is enormous.

    He spent roughly 167 days total in disciplinary isolation (DSI): bare boards instead of a bed, calorie-poor mash, cold summer and winter from an open vent window. He said he stayed in shape with exercise—including sets of up to 140 push-ups. Weight fell from 93 to 74 kg over investigation and imprisonment. Sources agree—including Novy Chas and Nasha Niva.

    The night of departure: “I won’t go without guarantees”—and the right to be home

    When the night convoy said they were taking him to Poland, Poczobut first stopped them: he wanted officials from both sides and a verbal assurance he could return to Belarus. It is reported that a representative from the presidential administration arrived and commitments were relayed via the Polish side. For a journalist who has always anchored himself in the west-Belarusian story of events, that is no bureaucratic trivia—it restores the meaning of a life stripped by the regime of the word “traitor.”

    In a video comment for Svaboda he tells the audience to “stay steadfast in what you believe,” and speaks cautiously about his health on the outside—that doctors say he is doing “better than expected.”

    Poczobut’s case is not a petty wrong the public could shrug off long ago. It is how the state machine turns against unwelcome speech, minority rights, and people who openly write about Polish history on Belarusian soil. When the regime briefly lets a hostage go, an editorial obligation is not only to celebrate but to record how the pressure worked and how refusal to break sounded—before the facts blunt the audience’s memory.

  • On the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl NPP disaster, the “The Chernobyl Way” crossed paths in Florida

    On the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl NPP disaster, the “The Chernobyl Way” crossed paths in Florida

    In Belarus today, going out with a flag means prison. Here in Florida, we can walk freely. Let us use that freedom.

    Each of us is a voice for those who have been forced into silence.

    Every year on April 26, Belarusians remember the Chernobyl disaster and its long aftermath by joining Charnobylski Shlyakh (“the Chernobyl Way”) — in memory of the victims, in protest against deception, and in solidarity with everyone who bore and still bears the weight of that catastrophe and the state’s choices that followed.

    The Zmagar association organized a gathering in this spirit in Florida for members of the diaspora: to remember alongside one another rather than alone — with adults, children, and friends.

    Why “here” matters

    Today in Belarus, anyone making a public appearance with symbols—including the historical Belarusian flag—faces severe punishment. The central message of the meeting in Florida was simple: wherever it is still possible to march without fear of reprisal, one must not forgo that opportunity—not least for the sake of those who are currently deprived of such a choice.

    In remembrance

    • We remember the tragedy at Chernobyl and what it continues to mean for Belarus.
    • We do not stay silent where we can still be heard.
    • We walk together — step by step with everyone for whom this still matters.
  • 30 years of “Viasna”: behind the date stand not a chronicle, but human lives.

    30 years of “Viasna”: behind the date stand not a chronicle, but human lives.

    On April 26, 2026, the Human Rights Center “Viasna” turns 30. Behind this round date stand thousands of appeals, lists of repressions, letters to political prisoners, and the lives of people who made “Viasna” what Belarus and the world know it to be: from the “Viasna‑96” campaign to the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize for its founder Ales Bialiatski, and to its current work in exile.

    How Viasna was born

    The organization emerged in April 1996 as the “Viasna‑96” initiative in response to the brutal crackdown on that spring’s protests and the mass detentions that followed: someone had to help those arrested and their families. On June 15, 1999, the center was officially registered in Minsk under the name Human Rights Center “Viasna”; ever since, the movement’s website has been spring96.org. Over the years, Viasna has grown into one of the key NGOs in the region — monitoring human rights violations, supporting political prisoners, and working on the death penalty, torture, and elections.

    Awards and the price of repression

    Here are some of the key awards Viasna has received in recent years:

    The price — criminal cases, searches, prison sentences, and the organization’s 2023 designation as an “extremist formation,” after which any cooperation with Viasna from inside the country formally became a criminal risk for ordinary citizens.

    2026: an anniversary in Warsaw

    On April 21, 2026, the Museum of Free Belarus in Warsaw hosted a celebration of Viasna’s 30th anniversary. Ales Bialiatski spoke about how the organization has rebuilt its work in Poland: the core team operates out of Warsaw (with parts of it in Vilnius and Białystok), and — after five difficult years of prisons and emigration — a new generation of “Viasna people” is stepping in. On April 26, Belarusian Radio Racyja (Poland) published a conversation with Uladzimir Vialichkin on the evolution of repressions in Belarus.

    Behind this date there is not merely a chronology of events, but lives: of those who wrote the chronicle of repressions from behind bars, of those who stayed in the country under threat, of those who left and now keep the spring96 line running, and of those whose names are searched for every day in the lists on the website and on Telegram.

    What is worth remembering

    Thirty years is an occasion to recall the unbroken continuity of solidarity: from parcels passed into pre‑trial detention in 1996, to the documentation work of 2020–2025, to the global visibility of Belarusian human rights defense. Viasna continues its path after dissolution and imprisonments — April 26, 2026, is a date about people, not only about an organization.

  • “This leaves people effectively rightless.” UN condemns Belarus for invalidating passports of exiled citizens

    “This leaves people effectively rightless.” UN condemns Belarus for invalidating passports of exiled citizens

    On 20 April 2026, the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus issued two parallel statements: one on “deeply alarming” practices inside Belarusian prisons and another statement strongly condemning the invalidation of passports of former political prisoners forcibly expelled from the country in 2025 and 2026. The experts say such measures are contrary to international law, leave people “effectively rightless,” increase the risk of statelessness, and must be reversed immediately.

    What exactly the UN said

    In the press release by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the accompanying statement of the Group of Independent Experts, it is emphasised that the Belarusian authorities have declared invalid the passports of people released from prison and forcibly removed across the border — primarily to Lithuania — without legal grounds or any proper justification.

    “Invalidating a passport constitutes a legal violation when such action is arbitrary, discriminatory, disproportionate, or lacks a clear legal basis or due process,” the Group said in its statement.

    The experts recall that such practices breach several norms of international law at once: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and four articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — freedom of movement, the right to enter one’s own country, the right to recognition as a person before the law, and the principle of non-discrimination. The statements also refer to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness — two treaties Belarus agreed to ratify during its 2020 Universal Periodic Review.

    What it looks like in people’s lives

    UN experts interviewed a large number of former political prisoners. The consequences they describe are far from a mere formality:

    • inability to return to Belarus and forced separation from families;
    • difficulties in obtaining legal status in host countries;
    • restricted access to work, healthcare, housing and education;
    • prolonged legal uncertainty and a real risk of ending up stateless.

    As REFORM.news reports, among those whose passports were already declared invalid in March 2026 is the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and founder of the Human Rights Center “Viasna,” Ales Bialiatski.

    Context: where “invalid passports” come from

    The UN statement continues a longer line of concern. Already in December 2025, independent UN experts had condemned the forced expulsion itself: on 11 September 2025, under an agreement with the United States, Belarus released from prison and brought to the Lithuanian border 52 people — mostly Belarusian citizens: politicians, journalists and trade unionists. According to the UN, 14 of those expelled had their identity documents confiscated, one held an expired passport and another a passport with torn-out pages. Opposition politician Mikalai Statkevich refused to cross the border and subsequently disappeared.

    The legal framework for these measures is a system built up over recent years:

    • the 2022 and 2023 constitutional and legislative amendments, which allow the revocation of citizenship of those convicted in absentia of “extremism” or “causing serious harm to the interests of Belarus” — without a fair trial;
    • the 2023 Presidential Decree on consular services, which effectively ended the issuance and renewal of identity documents for Belarusians abroad through consulates.

    “This is yet another measure taken by Belarusian authorities which leads to a risk of statelessness,” the UN experts stressed.

    In parallel — a statement on prisons

    On the same day, 20 April 2026, the Group of Experts also released a separate statement on “deeply alarming” practices in Belarusian penal colonies: torture, prolonged isolation, deaths and serious injuries of inmates. The experts call on Minsk to guarantee humane conditions of detention, ensure access to independent medical and psychological assistance, and conduct proper investigations of all deaths and serious injuries in places of deprivation of liberty. According to the Human Rights Center “Viasna”, more than 1,100 political prisoners are still being held in Belarusian prisons.

    What the UN is demanding

    The Group of Independent Experts addresses the Belarusian authorities with a concrete set of demands:

    • immediately remedy the situation with invalidated passports and restore the rights of the individuals affected;
    • stop adopting and revoke all measures that create a risk of statelessness;
    • review anti-extremism and counter-terrorism legislation, which the experts consider incompatible with international human rights law;
    • ensure humane conditions of detention and independent medical access for political prisoners.
  • Photographer Aliaksandr Shishko detained at Minsk airport on return from Georgia

    Photographer Aliaksandr Shishko detained at Minsk airport on return from Georgia

    On 14 April 2026, photographer Aliaksandr Shishko was detained at Minsk National Airport. The information was published on the DissidentBY project website; rights defender Roman Kislyak confirmed it for Pozirk.

    Aliaksandr had lived in Tbilisi since at least 2022. Why he returned to Belarus is hard to say; perhaps he missed his homeland and his family. I think he misjudged the risk of being detained — he thought he would slip through.

    — Kislyak said.

    The rights defender noted that after Freedom Day 2024, propagandists began mentioning Shishko in their materials.

    As far as I know, a criminal case was opened over holding Freedom Day events abroad, and as part of that case his apartment in Belarus was searched.

    — Kislyak added.

    According to summaries in independent media, reports also raise the issue of restrictions on disposing of the photographer’s housing (alongside the practice of sealing flats in criminal cases). Shishko’s name appeared in an ONT segment with host Ihar Tur on the seizure and sealing of property belonging to activists who had left the country: the on-air list included, among others, Aliaksandr Shishko and others; as critics of the broadcast recounted, the flats were sealed in the context of criminal cases (Nasha Niva).

    Authorities in Minsk routinely threaten criminal prosecution against participants in public actions abroad.

    In autumn 2025, independent outlets reported mass detentions on entry into Belarus; open sources cited figures on the order of a hundred or more cases — totals may be higher depending on how they are counted. Viasna Human Rights Centre and partners regularly receive reports of questionings and detentions at Belarusian border crossings and airports, a pattern that has continued for several years.

    Chronicle of political persecution — 14 April

    In Belarus, detentions and raids continue, as do administrative and criminal trials; there are reports of harsh conditions in detention facilities and pressure on political prisoners; independent media products and initiatives are still added to lists of “extremist” materials and formations.

    On 14 April 2026, the Viasna Human Rights Centre and related channels continue to collect and publish facts of politically motivated persecution of Belarusian women and men — as an updating chronicle (including via spring96.org). Information is added as new data comes in.

    The story of Aliaksandr Shishko’s detention at the airport fits this pattern: return from abroad, prior attention from security structures to his person, and a criminal line tied to the public agenda of emigration and Freedom Day.

  • Security forces visited ZROBIM Architects’ Minsk office two days in a row: what we know

    Security forces visited ZROBIM Architects’ Minsk office two days in a row: what we know

    ZROBIM Architects—one of the most prominent firms in the Belarusian market, with a strong international profile—was in the crosshairs of law enforcement on two consecutive days. On 9 April 2026 the story was a mass raid with on-site detentions; on 10 April investigators appeared to be operating on the logic of picking up those who had not been there the day before.

    Timeline (according to independent media)

    Morning of 9 April. Officers from the Financial Investigations Department (references in reports mention the Department of Financial Investigations) came to the Minsk office. Around 11:00, various bulletins spoke of dozens of people detained right at their desks—press figures hovered around 50–52. Some reports mentioned blocking or loss of access to an internal server. Among those detained was co-founder Andrei Makouski; the second co-founder, Aliaksei Karableu, was reportedly not living in the country at the time (United States), according to media.

    10 April. Security forces were in the office again. Per Belsat and Charter 97, employees were summoned to the premises, and people were detained including those who had not been present during the first raid—the feed included wording along the lines of “detaining everyone who wasn’t here yesterday.” Most of those detained the previous day had been released by then, but the criminal-procedural backdrop and the status of individual figures, including Makouski, remained unclear in open sources—this should be checked against the latest updates from human rights defenders and relatives.

    Theory of motive: a post about an “ideologist”

    There is little in the way of a single official comment from the authorities in the material reviewed. REFORM.news and other outlets quoted a pro-government Telegram channel: it linked the raid to a post by Makouski on Threads describing a demand from state bodies for a full-time “ideologist” at the company. The channel’s tone was accusatory (“shouldn’t have cracked jokes…”), framing the episode as a political-ideological clash, not merely a “tax inspection.”

    Separately, the AP notes a wider context: Belarus has seen more actions against independent professional circles, including use of criminal law and mass search practices.

    About the studio

    ZROBIM has operated since 2011, delivers projects in Belarus and abroad, and has repeatedly been noted in international competitions (reports have cited, among others, an IIDA Global Excellence Award 2025 for an educational project in Novaya Barovaya).

    Bottom line

    This was not a one-off “swoop” but a two-day operation involving mass detentions and technical pressure (the server). In the public narrative the cause is explained through the dispute over the manager’s post about an in-house ideologist; the legal qualification and outcome for each person involved remain opaque to readers for now.

  • The “Hajun case”: what it is, what sentences have been handed down, and how it continues in 2026

    The “Hajun case”: what it is, what sentences have been handed down, and how it continues in 2026

    Belarusian Hajun is a civic monitoring project launched in early 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Through a Telegram bot and community, it collected photos and information on the movement of Russian military equipment across Belarus. As early as 2022 the authorities of Belarus designated the project an extremist formation; in subsequent years participants and those who passed on data have mainly been charged under Article 361-4 of the Criminal Code—“assistance to extremist activity.”

    Turning point: compromise of the bot in February 2025

    On 5 February 2025 law enforcement gained access to the bot’s infrastructure (publicly described as a hack or compromise). Independent media estimated that data on roughly 30,000 users who had submitted material was exposed. Founder Anton Motolko announced the closure of the project. A mass wave of detentions across the country followed.

    The founder: trial in absentia

    Anton Motolko (journalist, media strategist, in exile since 2020) was sentenced in absentia by the Hrodna Regional Court in June 2025 to 20 years in a penal colony and a large fine (reports cited on the order of €24,000–28,000 / 84,000 BYN). Charges in various summaries included treason, calls to seize power, mass disorder, discreditation [of Belarus], and a number of other articles. The ruling could be appealed.

    Trials and articles

    Those who sent messages to the bot have been prosecuted in large numbers under Part 1 and/or Part 2 of Article 361-4. As Nasha Niva explained, a single submission is charged under Part 1 (up to 4 years of restriction of liberty without imprisonment—“home restriction” [often called “home chemistry” in Belarusian context], or 2–6 years in a colony); several messages trigger Part 2 as well (2–5 years of “chemistry” [restriction with assignment to an institution] or 3–7 years in a colony). The same article is applied to other forms of “assistance” to extremist structures and media, so not everyone convicted under 361-4 belongs in “pure Hayun” statistics without checking the case file.

    According to a Nasha Niva sample of people convicted only under 361-4 with a final sentence after July 2025 (when the “pipeline” began after the breach), of 75 people, 65% received home restriction, 35% received harsher penalties (colony or “chemistry” with placement in a correctional facility).

    Detentions in 2026

    The human rights centre Viasna publicly raised its minimum estimates of the number of people in custody specifically in the Hayun line:

    • 19 January 2026 — at least 163 people detained and remanded.
    • Early February 2026 — an update cited at least 175 detainees.
    • A later figure — at least 183 people held in custody.

    Viasna and Mediazona stressed that people keep becoming suspects across the country and that proceedings are not winding down.

    In a January roundup Mediazona noted directly: home restriction is imposed most often, but colony sentences and “chemistry” with placement in an open-type correctional institution (ИУОТ) also occur—formally not “prison,” but with substantial restrictions.

    Mediazona Belarus published a major piece on the anniversary of the leak (5 February 2026) on the consequences for project participants—a useful milestone for a “one year on” framing.

    Bottom line

    The “Hayun case” in 2026 is not a past spike but an ongoing conveyor: human rights defenders have steadily raised the bar for confirmed numbers in custody from 163 to 183+ in the first months of the year while new detentions are still recorded. Hearings run almost daily; Article 361-4 dominates. A separate layer is the listing of hundreds of convicts in the Interior Ministry’s extremist register, which extends the consequences after sentencing.

  • Release of political prisoners in Belarus: context and scale

    Release of political prisoners in Belarus: context and scale

    Minsk. In 2025–2026, open sources repeatedly reported mass pardons of people whom human rights groups classify as political prisoners. These events unfolded against the backdrop of Belarusian leadership’s foreign-policy contacts with the United States and a partial reassessment of Western sanctions, including in trade and transport.

    Timeline (from media and monitoring reports)

    In autumn 2025, a large group of prisoners was released under arrangements with Washington as described in the press. Some of those freed were taken to the state border to leave the country.

    In December 2025, the authorities announced the pardon of another group — lists included, among others, figures from high-profile cases after the 2020 presidential election.

    In spring 2026, media reported a new wave of pardons numbering on the order of several hundred people. Reports said some of those released remained in the country, while others left.

    Legal and human rights assessment

    A pardon does not quash the conviction and does not declare it unlawful. International and Belarusian independent rights defenders stress that repression of dissent continues: according to the Viasna Human Rights Centre, on certain dates in 2026 the political prisoner list still stood at roughly 1.1–1.2 thousand people. The organisation notes that the list is not exhaustive. Human Rights Watch and others link mass detentions and sentences after 2020 to restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association.

    Bottom line

    Mass exits from detention lower the headcount on political-prisoner lists, yet monitoring groups assess the scale of politically motivated criminal prosecution as still large. The foreign-policy context of the releases does not remove questions about conditions of detention, access to justice, and the fate of those still serving sentences.

  • Belarus in Freedom House 2026: “Not Free” status and zero scores for the opposition

    Belarus in Freedom House 2026: “Not Free” status and zero scores for the opposition

    Freedom House has published the latest Freedom in the World edition for 2026 (covering calendar 2025). In the country chapter, Belarus is again classed as Not Free: an overall score of 7 out of 100, political rights 1 out of 40, civil liberties 6 out of 60. Compared with the previous year, the aggregate rating is unchanged (7/100; Not Free status retained).

    Assessment of the political system

    The country overview states that Belarus is an authoritarian state where elections are openly rigged, civil liberties are tightly restricted, and security forces use violence and arbitrarily detain journalists, activists, and citizens who criticise the authorities. The judiciary and other institutions, in the authors’ wording, lack independence and do not constrain President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s powers.

    The opposition (the report’s methodology)

    In the table for political pluralism and participation, Belarus receives zero on several indicators, including whether the opposition has a realistic chance to build support or take power through elections. Together with zero scores on party freedom, freedom of political choice, and other items, Freedom House’s own framing means no competitive politics within the official system. In editorial terms, that matches a situation where organised legal opposition inside the country is effectively ruled out of permissible political activity — not as a separate quotation but as an inference from the report’s zero scores and its description of repression.

    Key events of 2025

    The report notes the presidential campaign in January 2025 and the result announced by the state for the incumbent (about 87% of the vote); the campaign, it stresses, took place amid severe political repression and continuing harsh persecution of any dissent.

    It mentions two episodes of releases of political prisoners following high-level contacts between US officials and President Lukashenka. Names cited include, among others, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Maryia Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, and human rights defender and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski. The text emphasises that many of those freed were taken out to Lithuania and Ukraine, often without identity documents. At year’s end, according to the Viasna Human Rights Centre, the country still held more than 1,100 political prisoners.

    The report also records the expansion of “anti-extremist” practice: courts designated more than 2,000 items of information “extremist” (messenger channels, books, social media accounts); the “extremist formations” list includes more than 300 entities, including education initiatives, NGOs, independent media, creative and other groups.

    Belarus in the global picture

    In Freedom in the World 2026, Freedom House stresses a 20th consecutive year of worsening aggregate freedom worldwide. Belarus’s 7 out of 100 places it among states with very low political rights and civil liberties.

  • Freedom Day 2026

    Freedom Day 2026

    On 25 March 2026, the 108th anniversary of the proclamation of the Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR) is marked — Freedom Day (Dzień Voli). On this day Belarusians around the world hold solidarity actions, cultural events, and rallies organised by the diaspora, including under the umbrella of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office.

    Main points for Freedom Day 2026:

    • Symbolism: Freedom Day (Dzień Voli) is an unofficial independence day for the statehood proclaimed in 1918.
    • Events: Solidarity actions are planned in many cities worldwide, including Białystok and Chicago.
    • Appeals: Leaders of the democratic forces, including Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, issue calls for Belarusians to unite.
    • Atmosphere: Events take place under white-red-white flags, underscoring national identity and the aspiration for democracy.

    In 2026, the day stands as a symbol of the continuing struggle for independence and democratic change.